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Introduction 
 
The External Tank (ET) is a component of the Space Shuttle launch vehicle that contains 
fuel and oxidizer.  During launch, the ET supplies the space shuttle main engines with 
liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen.  In addition to supplying fuel and oxidizer, it is the 
backbone structural component of the Space Shuttle.  It is comprised of a liquid hydrogen 
(LH2) tank and a liquid oxygen (LOX) tank, which are separated by an Intertank.  The 
Intertank is a stringer-stiffened cylindrical structure with hat-section stringers that are roll 
formed from aluminum-lithium alloy Al-2090. 
 
Cracks in the Intertank stringers of the STS-133 ET were noticed after a November 5, 
2010 launch attempt.  The cracks were approximately nine inches long and occurred on 
the forward end of the Intertank (near the LOX tank), along the fastener line, and were 
believed to have occurred while loading the ET with the cryogenic propellants.  These 
cracks generated questions about the structural integrity of the Intertank. 
 
In order to determine the structural capability of the Intertank with varying degrees of 
damage, a finite element model (FEM) simulating a 1995 compression panel test was 
analyzed and correlated to test data.  Varying degrees of damage were simulated in the 
FEM, and non-linear stability analyses were performed.  The high degree of similarity 
between the compression panel and the Intertank provided confidence that the ET 
Intertank would have similar capabilities.   
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Background 
 
In 1995 and 1996, tests were conducted on compression panels that were based on 
sections of the Super Lightweight Tank (SLWT) Intertank [1].  The tests incorporated 
flight-like thermal conditions and simulated thermal deflections at the LH2/Intertank 
interface (the location of the bounding compressive design loads).  The test setup used an 
adjustable cryogenic base and rollers to achieve flight-like boundary conditions.  The 
compression panel was 137.48 inches long, 33.2 inches wide, and is detailed in Figure 1.  
The test setup is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 1: Compression Panel Overview 
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Figure 2. Compression Panel Test Setup
 At the time this analysis was initiated, all the known cracks in the STS-133 ET were 
located at the LOX/Intertank interface.  However, it was unknown if any cracks existed at 
the LH2/Intertank interface.  Furthermore, because the most severe compressive loads 
occur at the LH2/Intertank interface, it was decided that analysis of this test article would 
be insightful for determining structural capability. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
The compression panel FEM is shown in Figure 3 and is modeled primarily with shell 
elements.  The fasteners are modeled as linear elastic beam elements, and fastener failure 
is not considered.  Non-linear connector elements are modeled to simulate the roll ties 
included in the test setup (acting as springs in tension, but not carrying load in 
compression).  Contact is simulated between stringers, frame chords, and the panel skin.  
Material plasticity is included in the skin, stringers, and a stiffening plate (doubler).  The 
panel FEM and boundary conditions are modeled from drawings 80900203064 and 
97M22728 [2, 3], which were provided by NASA. 
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Figure 3: Compression Panel FEM (symmetric elements shown as faded for clarity) 
 
 
The panel compressive load capability is predicted using an incremental, non-linear static 
solution procedure [4] in ABAQUS v6.9
3
.  Several analysis steps are needed to 
adequately approximate the test through FEM analysis.  The first step involves 
preloading the fasteners to ensure contact between stringers, skin, and frame chords.  A 
second step applies thermal loads and simulates thermal displacement at the aft end of the 
                                                 
3
 ABAQUS is a registered trademark of Dassault Systèmes. 
4 
panel.  A third step incrementally displaces the top of the panel to a load value just below 
the buckling load (~90%).  The final step increases the displacement at the top of the 
panel FEM into the post-buckled region and implements static stabilization to aid in 
convergence. 
 
The FEM is first analyzed based on the as-tested configuration.  Once the FEM shows a 
high degree of correlation to the test data, the FEM is modified to be more flight-like.  
Modifications include modifying the skin thickness from 0.085 inches to 0.083 inches, 
removing the doubler plate on the aft end of the panel, and increasing the thermal 
deflection to 0.625 inches.  An undamaged, pristine flight-like configuration is analyzed 
first to achieve a baseline result. 
 
An out-of-family material behavior that was not controlled by the material acceptance 
requirements was determined to be a likely contributor to the crack failures.  This out-of-
family behavior was traced to stringers manufactured from two specific lots of Al-2090 
sheet.  The material properties of the stringers in the FEM are modified to match those of 
the “suspect” lots of Al-2090 based on test data. 
 
A design limit load was provided by NASA and is used for fail-safe margin calculations 
based on Intertank limit loads for stringers S9-1 and S10-1, the highest loaded stringers 
on the Intertank. 
 
Different degrees of damage are simulated by separating elements in the sections of the 
stringers where the cracks were observed on the STS-133 ET.  Fastener elements were 
also separated from the stringer elements in the cracked area.  Negative fail-safe margins 
were calculated for one of the damaged configurations involving cracks in multiple 
stringers.  To determine whether the negative margins were driven by the large size of the 
damaged area with respect to the narrow panel width, an augmented FEM that was nine 
stringers wide was created to investigate size effects.  All of the FEM configurations 
analyzed are described in Table 1. 
 
 
Results 
 
The as-tested FEM correlates well with test data and closely matches the test failure 
mode.  The global failure mode is shown in Figure 4. 
 
The FEM strain predictions correlate very well with strain gage data and accurately 
predict the onset of skin buckling.  The test setup did not measure the axial displacement 
of the panel, so correlation of FEM displacement cannot be determined.  However, the 
load-displacement curve for the FEM is compared to the global failure load in Figure 5. 
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Table 1: Panel FEM configurations analyzed 
Study Purpose 
As-tested panel configuration Baseline to correlate and anchor test data 
Flight-like panel configuration Flight-like baseline for comparison 
Flight-like panel configuration 
with 7.3-inch cracks in both feet of the middle 
stringer extending to the first rivet  
Fail-safe capability prediction for a compression 
test with one stringer degraded/damaged 
Flight-like panel configuration 
with 12-inch cracks in both feet of the middle 
stringer 
Fail-safe capability prediction for a compression 
test with one stringer degraded/damaged 
Flight-like panel configuration 
with 7.3-inch cracks in both feet of the middle 
three stringers 
Fail-safe capability prediction for a compression 
test with multiple stringers degraded/damaged 
Flight-like panel configuration with short 
radius blocks on all stringers and no cracks in 
any stringer feet 
Determine impact of radius blocks to global 
response and buckling capability of panel (Do-
no-harm assessment) 
Flight-like panel configuration with “foot-
down” imperfection applied to the ends of the 
stringers 
Determine impact of residual assembly stresses 
due to “foot-down” stringer imperfections to 
global response and buckling capability of panel 
Augmented flight-like panel configuration 
(pristine) 
Baseline for comparison with flight-like 
baseline 
Augmented flight-like panel configuration 
with 7.3-inch cracks in both feet of the middle 
three stringers  
Determine if the negative fail-safe margin 
observed in the flight-like panel configuration 
with cracks in both feet of the middle three 
stringers was due to number of remaining 
stringers to take load, or is a truly negative fail-
safe margin 
 
 
Global failure occurs at a 
similar location and in a 
similar manner as the test
 
Figure 4: Test panel FEM global failure mode 
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Figure 5: Load-displacement curve for test panel FEM 
 
 
The FEM overpredicts the test failure load by 19.6%.  Material damage is not simulated 
with the as-tested FEM, which may contribute to the overprediction.  To take into 
account the FEM overprediction, a knockdown factor of 0.836 is applied for all load 
capability calculations and for all configurations tested. 
 
The varying degrees of damage (outlined in Table 1) affected the structural capability of 
the FEM, but positive fail-safe margins are maintained for all damage conditions 
considered.  A negative margin was calculated for the configuration involving cracks in 
multiple stringers, although an augmented FEM with the same damage condition showed 
positive margins.  This indicates that the negative margin was dependent on the panel 
size, and was therefore disregarded, as positive margins were shown for the augmented 
panel FEM.  The fail-safe margin summary is shown in Table 2. 
 
The findings from the analyses for the different damaged configurations contributed to 
flight rationale by adding confidence that moderate levels of undetected or new damage 
to the STS-133 Intertank would likely maintain positive fail-safe margins. 
 
In this paper, additional details of the finite element analyses and test-analysis correlation 
for the stringer panel compression test will be presented.  The analyses and results will be 
discussed as they related to the development of the flight rationale for STS-133. 
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Table 2: Fail-safe margin summary 
Study Fail-Safe Margin 
As-tested panel configuration N/A (test baseline) 
Flight-like panel configuration +0.13 
Flight-like panel configuration 
with 7.3-inch cracks in both feet of the middle 
stringer extending to the first rivet  
+0.15 
Flight-like panel configuration 
with 12-inch cracks in both feet of the middle 
stringer 
+0.16 
Flight-like panel configuration 
with 7.3-inch cracks in both feet of the middle 
three stringers 
-0.26 
Flight-like panel configuration with short 
radius blocks on all stringers and no cracks in 
any stringer feet 
+0.13 
Flight-like panel configuration with “foot-
down” imperfection applied to the ends of the 
stringers 
+0.14 
Augmented flight-like panel configuration 
(pristine) 
+0.12 
Augmented flight-like panel configuration 
with 7.3-inch cracks in both feet of the middle 
three stringers  
+0.10 
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